Real-Time Market Model for Pricing Differentiated Services by Davoyan, Ruzana & Altmann, Jorn
Real-Time Market Model for Pricing Differentiated Services 
 
 
Ruzana Davoyan1,2 and Jörn Altmann2,3 
1 Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Mannheim 
2 School of Information Technology, International University in Germany 






Pricing network resources is a crucial component 
for proper resource management and the provision of 
quality of service guarantees. In this paper we propose 
a decentralized real-time market (RTM) model for 
pricing differentiated services (DiffServ), which 
attempts to achieve efficient resource allocation, while 
reducing computational overheads. We review issues 
relating to congestion sensitive pricing of the network 
resources and propose an approach to alleviate price 
fluctuation that considers the actual state of the 
network. In comparison with the existing studies that 
consider the existence of a single point of market 
equilibrium, we consider the existence of a set of 
equilibrium states. The proposed strategy relies on the 
division of link capacity into intervals called steps, 
where current supply is determined according to the 
expected resource prices, and is the sum of the 
allocated steps. Consequently, the real state of the 
market is described by immediately accessible 





Since its inception, the Internet has been in a 
constant state of evolution, driven by an increasing 
demand for the efficient delivery of bandwidth by a 
user base, which has expanded both in terms of 
numbers, and demographics. Modern Internet 
infrastructure has to allow for the provision of high-
quality real-time multimedia services, such as 
videoconferencing, in addition to the best-effort 
services. In order to achieve a more efficient provision 
of interactive multimedia content over the Internet, a 
number of techniques and notions have been 
formulated relating to the problems of unexpected 
packet delay, and network latency, such as quality of 
service (QoS) guarantee. The integrated services 
(IntServ) and the differentiated services (DiffServ) 
frameworks have been standardized by the IETF to 
aim QoS guarantee. The IntServ architecture [1] is 
built upon the resource reservation protocol (RSVP) 
[2] and provides guaranteed QoS. An application that 
requires end-to-end QoS makes a reservation using the 
signaling protocol. Each node along a path, using 
admission control, checks whether sufficient resources 
are available to accept the new reservation. Unlike 
IntServ, the DiffServ architecture, specified in [3], 
classifies traffic according to many different 
parameters, such as source and/or destination 
addresses etc., and marks as belonging to a specific 
traffic class. Traffic classification and marking are 
done at the edge nodes based on the established 
between domains service level agreements (SLAs), 
which specify implicitly or explicitly how transit 
traffic should be considered when crossing from one 
domain to another. Within the DiffServ domain each 
node implements Per-Hop Behaviors (PHBs), which 
define forwarding properties of a packet associated 
with a specific class [5], [6]. The PHB is identified by 
encoding a value in a 6-bit field known as the 
Differentiated Service Code Point (DSCP) [4], which 
is stored in the Type of Service (TOS) byte of the IP 
header, and specifies QoS service semantics. 
Classification of traffic into a small number of classes 
reduces flow state information to be kept on each node, 
and maintenances a simple core, where the decisions of 
the core nodes are local and based on the determined 
PHBs. Because of its simplicity and scalability, the 
DiffServ architecture is foreseen to be implemented in 
the Internet [7]. Differentiation of the Internet services 
in respect to QoS has to rely on pricing in order to 
allow the users to choose appropriate services. Unlike 
pricing IntServ, which is based on allocated resources, 
pricing DiffServ is more complicated and at present is 
an open issue. Pricing plays a fundamental role to 
convey information about resource availability among 
networks and to control network congestion. 
Fourth International Conference on Networking and Services
0-7695-3094-X/08 $25.00 © 2008 IEEE
DOI 10.1109/ICNS.2008.38
134
Authorized licensed use limited to: Seoul National University. Downloaded on March 20, 2009 at 12:07 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
There exists a large body of literature regarding 
pricing approaches, which are mainly focused on 
setting optimal prices based on computation of 
marginal congestion costs. While achieving the social 
welfare or provider’s revenue maximization [14] under 
detailed calculation of marginal congestion costs, 
dynamic pricing leads to undesirable for the user price 
fluctuation and computational overheads required to 
derive these prices. The main goal of our research was 
to introduce economic model for efficient resource 
management, which alleviates complexity of the 
dynamic pricing strategies. This study can be 
differentiated from the others in two ways. Firstly, the 
main idea behind the proposed strategy of reducing 
price fluctuation is approximation of average marginal 
congestion costs, under the division of link capacity 
into intervals, referred to as steps. Therefore, in 
comparison with the existing approaches, which 
consider utilization of the full link, while setting 
optimal prices, we consider capacity as a dynamically 
changing function, which is based on market 
expectations. And secondly, movement of a whole 
system is described by a two-period economy [24], 
[28], where providers, under certain circumstances 
form expectations about future spot prices, and then 
make decisions about supply plans in order to 
eliminate the existence of equilibrium perturbation in 
the system. It is important to note, that since the real-
time market state is described by immediately 
accessible information, such as price, in our model 
provider’s expectations about future spot price are 
based on a spot price observation, although history of 
supply and demand is also available. 
The work in [8] is related to ours in a sense of 
interpreted supply function. However, these two 
approaches differ significantly. While we assume that 
supply is a sum of allocated steps, i.e., it is not of 
necessity that all allocated resources are used the 
approach in [8] considers supply as the actually 
supplied capacity. Besides, we reduce price fluctuation 
by considering system floating between the 
equilibrium states. Considering dynamic demand, in 
our approach there are few equilibrium points 
corresponding to an offered supply, while in [8] there 
is one equilibrium point for an offered load. Finally, 
the proposed pricing strategy never tends to infinity, 
because this causes a link to be idle. Proposed in the 
work [9] expected capacity pricing approach is also 
focused on users’ expectation. In comparison with [9], 
where the customers are charged based on the expected 
volume of traffic, in this paper the users are charged 
based on an actual usage, according to the spot market 
price. Whereas the main idea of the edge pricing 
approach [10] is charging the customers based on the 
expected values of congestion and route, assuming that 
the utility and demand functions are stable over time, 
current study considers these characteristics dynamic 
and provides the pricing strategy based on the actual 
network state. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
describes background focusing on various issues of 
pricing network resources. Section 3 describes the 
proposed real-time market (RTM) model with capacity 
division approach and finally, Section 4 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Background and Fundamental Issues 
 
2.1. Optimization Problem 
 
Pricing network resources has drawn considerable 
attention in research area [9]-[12], [19]. A detailed 
overview and evaluation according to the different 
criteria of the proposed pricing schemes is given in 
[13]. Most of the studies seek to achieve economic 
(Pareto) efficiency [14], by establishing an 
optimization model and finding an optimal price for 
the network resource allocation. An optimization 
problem can be formulated as follows [14].  
Consider the market with a set of consumers 
{ }nN ,......1=  and services . Let  is the amount 
of services consumed by customer i  (
m ix
Ni∈ ) and 
denote the amount of services given 
to the users from 1 to n  correspondingly, i.e. the total 
demand. The utility function 
nxxx ++= ...1
( )ii xU  is equivalent to a 
certain monetary value, that customer i  is willing to 
pay having a vector of quantities of  services m
( )imii xxx ,...,1= . The consumer surplus maximization 
problem is defined as follows:  
( ) ( )[ ]iiii
x
i xpxUCS i −= max , 
       s. t.: a set of constraints, e.g. ( ) iii bxp ≤         (1) 
for all Ni∈ , where ( )ii xp  represents the actual 
amount that consumer  pays for the bundle ;  is 
a budget constraint of customer i . On the other hand, 
the provider tries to maximize own revenue by solving 
the following problem: 
i ix ib
 ( ) ( )[ ]xCxR
x
−max             (2) 
where ( )xR  denote revenue gained by the provider 
selling the network resources x ;  is cost of 
service provider producing network resources 
( )xC
x . 
Thus, optimization problem of the whole system is 
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defined as a sum of all utilities (social welfare) 







max ,     s. t. :          (3) xx
i
i∑ ≤
In essence, the existing approaches differ in a way 
of computing ( )ii xU , , and , as well as 
considering different set of constraints. In order to 
maximize social welfare (3) or provider’s revenue (2) 
the proposed pricing schemes [9]-[12] assume a priori 
knowledge of either a well-known user utility function 
or a demand function (based on market research) 
accordingly. A utility function, which expresses user’s 
willingness to pay for a certain QoS guarantee, in some 
approaches depends on the QoS metrics, such as delay 
or packet loss [12], [15], [16]. In real networks, 
however, it is impossible to predict such quality 
measures. As an application-layer performance 
measure, a utility function is quantified as an amount 
of the network resources allocated to a flow. 
Therefore, it is meaningful to distinguish elastic and 
inelastic traffic [17]. Unlike elastic traffic, which is 
tolerant to available bandwidth variation, inelastic 
traffic requires a fixed amount of bandwidth for a 
particular QoS. However, in [10] was argued that a 
utility function cannot be defined precisely in short-
term and sometimes even in long-term time frames, 
and in addition, user demand is difficult to predict. 
Thus, whether optimality is achieved in real world is 
still under doubt. Besides, the study in [10] argued that 
pricing network resources should shift away from the 
optimality paradigm and attempt to achieve reasonable 
level of efficiency. 
( )xR ( )xC
 
2.2. Static vs. Dynamic Pricing 
 
Pricing approaches that assume a priori knowledge 
of a demand function can be differentiated according 
to the time frames criteria. As a consequence, pricing 
schemes are classified into long (day or more) and 
short (minutes or less) pricing time frames, called 
static and dynamic pricing accordingly. Regarded as 
static pricing, usage-based charges [14] in the Internet 
can be two types: access time and total data volume 
charges. Another form of static pricing is flat-rate [14] 
under which the users are charged a monthly 
subscription regardless of usage and actual network 
conditions. Therefore, flat-rate pricing gives no 
incentive to the users to react on congestion or to limit 
their usage. Long pricing time frames, which consider 
a demand function stable over a contract period of 
time, do not address short-term congestion issue. 
Actually time-of-day is not able to preserve system 
equilibrium in terms of supply-demand balance, since 
a price is independent of the current network load. 
On the other hand, a dynamic price [14] depends on 
current network utilization, and is flexible to control 
congestion. Although the pricing schemes that focus to 
set price over a short period of time, maximize 
economic efficiency, deployment of such complex 
schemes is unrealistic. Whereas proposing dynamic 
pricing plans, it is possible to provide better QoS, such 
complex prices are unacceptable by users who are risk 
averse. Indeed, the customers do not want to face with 
varying prices, which may be difficult to understand. 
An experimental characterization of users’ behavior in 
relation to the prices of the network services is 
provided by the INDEX project [21], [22]. Besides, it 
was argued in [10], that price fluctuation causes high 
implementation costs and structural requirements. 
 
2.3. Congestion Impact 
 
Congestion is an example of negative market 
externality when a user can make different choices, 
which affect the other users, without suffering penalty 
[18]. Designed congestion costs address this issue. By 
charging the users, the provider tries to cover part or 
all costs (e.g. five types of costs as suggested in [19]) 
that occur in the computer networks. Congestion 
pricing scheme reflects on the actual state of the 
network in terms of excess demand for the network 
resources and covers congestion costs that a user 
imposes to the other users. During congestion the users 
are expected to adjust their sending rate [23], [11] in 
response to explicit (i.e. response from a congested 
router) or implicit (i.e. based on externally observable 
behavior of the network) feedbacks. However, it has 
been shown that although, sometimes congestion 
periods have a few milliseconds duration, and the users 
cannot react instantaneously, such deviations do not 
lead to network instability [20]. 
While solving the optimization problem most of the 
studies set prices at exactly the marginal congestion 
costs. When there are available resources in the 
network, i.e. demand does not exceed capacity, 
marginal congestion cost is essentially zero. The study 
in [10] has criticized the optimality paradigm by 
posing three reasons. The first argument is that 
marginal costs are small and insufficient to fully 
recover facility costs. In addition, it was argued that 
these costs are irrelevant to the efficiency of a system 
as a whole. Second reason shows inaccessibility of the 
marginal congestion costs. Indeed, since impact of 
congestion on different applications differs, the pricing 
schemes should take into account tolerance and 
intolerance of an application towards variation of 
packet delay and drop. As a consequence, it is hard to 
136
Authorized licensed use limited to: Seoul National University. Downloaded on March 20, 2009 at 12:07 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
measure the exact contribution of a particular flow to 
congestion. The last fact is that besides optimality, 
structural and implementation issues should be 
considered for practicability. Therefore, it is not the 
goal to reach optimality, but enough to set a price that 
provides an appropriate QoS level required for an 
application. 
 
2.4. Economic Equilibrium 
 
The basic principle of economic equilibrium 
requires knowledge of supply and demand functions, 
and defines a competitive market price [25]. Indeed, if 
both supply and demand are the functions of quantity 
and price, and are known, then the market price can be 
defined for a particular quantity of the product. While 
economic forces are balanced in the absence of 
external influences, this price is an equilibrium price. 
Walrasian equilibrium, aka competitive equilibrium, 
assumes that there is no excess in demand for any good 
when each participant buys the bundle, which is 
optimal for him under own budget constraint [14]. In 
general, the theoretical solution of general equilibrium 
describes the “static” equilibrium conditions, i.e. 
market clearing equations. Unlike the theoretical, the 
practical solution of a system describes a “dynamic” 
adjustment process, called tâtonnement process [14], 
i.e. Walrasian price-adjustment rule, which implies that 
no transaction and no production take place at price 
disequilibrium. If good demand excess, then price 
increases, and decreases for the goods with excess 
supply. Setting optimal price assumes that customer’s 
utility function depends only on the commodities that 
she or he consumes. However, in real world, there is 
positive economic externality, when value of a unit 
increases, as more users use it [18]. 
As cited in [26], “in reality, the equilibrium is never 
reached since, in so far as one tries to approach it, it 
continuously changes as the technical and economic 
conditions of production change. The real state is then 
a state of persistent oscillations around a central 
equilibrium point, which itself drifts away”. In spite of 
useful economic arguments for competitive 
equilibrium, in real life competitive equilibrium is 
often inapplicable of providing a practical means of 
pricing. The reason of such concept is that instead of 
observing total demand or total supply in real market, 
the prices of traded commodities are observed. 
Statistical analysis of historical data can be used; 
however, real-time state of the market is described by 
the prices. Besides, taking into account dynamic 
behavior of the whole system, it is meaningful to 
consider a set of equilibrium states, rather than one 
point of system equilibrium. 
3. Real-Time Market Model 
 
3.1. Motivation of Dynamic Equilibrium 
 
The basic idea of a market model is that system 
deviation from the equilibrium state produce forces, 
which try to return it to the equilibrium point as 
depicted in Fig. 1. Point E in Fig. 1 is an equilibrium 
state of a system, where the market clears price P0, 
under equal supply S and demand D. This equilibrium 
notion is similar to one of the necessary conditions of 
mechanical equilibrium, stating that the sum of forces 
on each particle of a system is equal to zero. If the 
price is set higher than the equilibrium one (P1 in Fig. 
1), it causes to surplus, i.e. supply exceeds demand. As 
a result, to sell this surplus provider decreases price. 
This encourages demand, and eventually equilibrium 
point will be reached. The opposite would happen if 




Figure 1. Market mechanism: the market clears at 
price P0 and quantity Q0. 
 
However, taking into account that the system 
components, such as users’ preferences and supply 
change over time, and the whole system is driven by a 
general movement we consider not the existence of a 
singular point of a solution, but rather movement along 
equilibrium. Thus, instead of setting optimal price we 
adopt the notion of dynamic equilibrium, where the 
market system consisting of the independent dynamic 
subsystems, such as supply and demand is in 
equilibrium, when all subsystems are in equilibrium in 
respect to each other. As a consequence of dynamic 
nature of the market, we assume that there should be 
not just a single equilibrium point, but a set of 
equilibrium states of the system. In addition to this, 
instead of considering the market that moves along 
equilibrium, as a set of price adjustment processes, 
where the price is regulated based on demand and 
supply, it is more meaningful to consider the market, 
as a set of market clearing processes [25], where the 
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market will eventually be cleared of all supply and 
demand excesses.  
 
3.2. Capacity Division 
 
As mentioned before, most of the literature is based 
on setting optimal prices so that all resources are 
utilized, while achieving social welfare or provider’s 
profit maximization. Since the current paper is focused 
to reduce undesirable price fluctuation, considering 
incremental congestion costs, we do not intend to 
provide optimal price, but attempt to achieve 
reasonable efficiency of the whole system. Thus in 
comparison with the existing approaches, which 
consider total link capacity, while optimizing resource 
allocation, we divide total capacity into intervals called 
steps, in order to control link utilization. In other 
words, a step indicates a certain level of link 
utilization. Therefore, the supply function is defined 
not by the total link capacity, but by a sum of allocated 
steps. We assume that within each step average costs 
as well as average marginal congestion costs remain 
unchanged. Indeed, considering U-shape average cost 
curve, average costs for production of different amount 
of the goods may be the same [25]. The motivation of 
the assumption of equal average marginal congestion 
costs is that congestion characteristics, such as 
utilization, queue length etc. are not instantaneous 
values, instead they are average measurements. Based 
on these prerequisites, we claim, that average resource 
allocation costs for a particular step of a certain link 
are unchanged. Steps can be chosen by network 
administrator for all links within a domain and made 
known to its routers. Empirical values or management 
policies could be used in order to set values of the 
steps. 
Taking into account that average allocation costs 
remain unchanged for each step, price defined by the 
provider for each step, called step price is unchanged 
within an interval, associated with a certain step. 
Consequently, neutral equilibrium is considered along 
step, meaning that the step price is constant for the 
allocated step when dynamically changing demand lies 
within the step bounds. A certain step price covers all 
costs appeared in the network for corresponding step. 
In order to maintain different QoS levels for the 
DiffServ architecture, appropriate step prices for the 
certain QoS levels should be defined by the provider. 
 
3.3. Two-period Model 
 
Since the real state of the market is described by 
immediately accessible information, such as a price, 
we adopt a two-period economy notion [24][28], in 
order to describe how the state of the dynamic market 
is changed. At first, the provider observes the spot 
price, forms expectation about future spot price, and 
then makes decision about supply plans in order to 
eliminate market disequilibrium. More specifically, the 
notion of a two-period economy is described as 
follows. Traders observe the spot price, and make 
expectation about a price in the next period. Generally, 
price deviation is not revealed to the observer 
instantaneously. In other words, price fluctuation does 
not reflect on demand immediately and the reason of 
such deviation is not clear for the buyers. At the same 
time the suppliers make assumption about the future, 
whether the price continues to increase or decrease. In 
case the suppliers decide that the price continues to 
increase, production, i.e. sum of the allocated steps, 
will be increased in order to balance the market. 
Consequently, this encourages demand and as a result, 
the market state is defined by feedback from the 
suppliers, i.e. how they react on price change. 
Eventually, supply decisions are based on the expected 
prices of the resources. Expectations of the traders 
about the future market state depend on the current 
market circumstances and the statistical analysis of 
historical data. However, it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to concern traders’ expectations. 
We model a system as the market, where the 
provider observes the spot price, and defines some 
expectation about the future spot price and the state of 
a system. Thus, we assume that a current supply 
decision is regulated by the expected resource price. 
Let us assume that the current price is p with a 
certain confidence that the expected price will be pexp, 







exp                           (4) 
where R  is the rate of return. However, in a 
decentralized environment ex-ante supply does not 
match ex-ante demand instantaneously, i.e. the system 
cannot immediately come to an equilibrium. Therefore, 
within the first period the spot price adjusts in 
proportion to the current ex-ante excess or shortage 
demand according to the following adjustment rule: 
kEp =
•
              (5) 
where  is a constant that is determined through 
a qualitative analysis of the dynamics of the market 
price, and 
0>k
E  denotes the current ex-ante excess or 
shortage demand function that is calculated by the 
following equation: 
( ) SpDE −=              (6) 
where ( )pD  is the total ex-ante demand and S  
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represents the total ex-ante supply of resources. Ex-
ante excess or shortage demand can take on positive 
and negative values, meaning price increase and 
decrease accordingly. In the proposed approach, the 
following cases can be considered: a) the spot price 
increases and adjusts according to the rule (5) 
if , b) the spot price is set to the appropriate 
step price of the last allocated step, if the ex-ante 
demand lies within the last allocated step bounds, i.e. 
, where  is the size of the last 
allocated step, c) otherwise, the spot price decreases 
and adjusts according to the rule (5). Therefore, the 
spot price is either set to the respective step price or 
adjusts according to the price adjustment rule. It is 
worth noting, that price adjustment rule does not 
represent the tâtonnement process, and differs in sense 
of market clearing. While the tâtonnement process 
always implies price rationing (e.g. price will decrease 
if supply exceeds demand), adjustment rule can 
involve quantity rationing (price can remain 
unchanged if supply exceeds demand). The total ex-
ante supply of resource adjusts according to the 
following rule:  
( ) SpD >


























             (7) 
Thus, the rule (7) shows that if the spot price does not 
match the expected one, providers review their plans 
and make further supply decisions. Fig. 2 illustrates an 
example of the above-described mechanism. The D1 
and D2 lines represent the maximal ex-ante demand 
for the appropriate allocated steps, such as Q0 and 
, with the step prices P0 and P2. Let us 
assume that the step Q0 is allocated and the user is 
charged the price P0, while demand does not excess 
supply (P0A interval). If demand exceeds upper bound 
of the allocated step Q0, the spot price increases and 
adjusts according to the rule (5) (AB interval) with on-
demand allocation of the  resources. It is 
important to note, that the provider does not allocate 
the step  immediately, but rather on-demand 
resource allocation is performed under the adjusted 
spot price. Once the spot price P1 is higher than the 
expected one P2, implies future excess demand, and the 
provide increases supply on the step at the end of the 
point Q2 in Fig.2, i.e. the supply curve shifts to right. 
Increase in supply when the future demand exceeds, 
switches the price to the step price of the last allocated 
step, i.e. to P2. If price were lower than expected one, 







Figure 2. Supply allocation. 
 
Taking into account that within each step neutral 
equilibrium is proposed, however, the whole system is 
described by dynamic equilibrium the RTM model is 
presented as a set of market clearing processes (i.e. the 
market clears at the appropriate step price under the 
allocated supply). Abstracting each step interval into a 
single equilibrium point, since the price is unchanged 
within the allocated step, whereas dynamic demand 
does not exceed step bounds, we can assume a set of 
equilibrium points. Economic stability [27], considers 
that the system is stable if demand curve is almost 
always represented as downward sloping, meaning that 
as price decreases, customer will buy more of the 
goods, and supply is upward sloping, meaning that as 
price increases, supplier wish to produce more of the 
goods. In essence, if the spot price adjusted according 
to the price adjustment rule (5) is less than the 
expected price, this encourages demand and 
consequently, switches the price to the step one and 
vice versa. 
Another feature of the proposed approach is that 
price never reaches infinity. Generally under high load 
of the network, the prices of the resources are too high 
and tend to infinity.  In this case all traffic will move 
off the link, advertised high price. As a consequence, 
the link will stay idle until it would advertise a low 
price. The effect of this instability is that under heavy 
load, many links would be idle, which is not desired in 
practice. Instead, increase in price is likely to be 
unattractive to some paths or services, but can still be 




In this paper we presented the decentralized real-
time market (RTM) model for pricing in DiffServ 
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networks, which alleviates complexity of congestion 
based pricing, and achieves efficient resource 
allocation. We have reviewed the issues relating to 
dynamic pricing of the network resources, and 
proposed the strategy to significantly reduce price 
fluctuation and computational overheads. For the 
purpose of alleviating price variation, we have divided 
link capacity into the steps, with approximate average 
marginal congestion costs, and have considered neutral 
equilibrium within each step. The proposed pricing 
strategy relies on the actual state of a system, and 
reflects on available in the network resources, 
allocated in real time. In addition, the approach is 
simple and scalable, and allows network administrators 
to make their own decision about how to set prices. 
The state of the RTM model is described by the 
prices of the traded resources, where the providers 
make decision on the current supply based on the 
expected prices. Considering the dynamical behavior 
of users’ preferences and supply, the movement of the 
whole system is described by a set of equilibrium 
points, each of which represents the step abstracted 
into a single equilibrium point. Thus, the proposed 
model is treated as a dynamic system composed of the 
subsystems, such as supply and demand, which are in 
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